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ISSUE ON APPEAL 
The narrow issue presented by this appeal is whether Draper 
City had a duty to Kenneth Snell to place a 40 mph speed limit 
sign on the east side of a one-mile stretch of road between its 
southern-most boundary and the intersection where Kenneth Snell 
collided with another vehicle. Appellants seek to establish an 
exception to the well-established Utah rule that a municipality 
does not have a duty to erect traffic control devices in the 
first instance, but only to properly place and maintain those 
that it does erect. Appellants argue that, by acting to place a 
speed limit sign in one location on a highway, Draper City 
thereby obligates itself to erect signs in other locations on the 
same highway. Appellants also seek to have this Court reverse 
recent rulings and abandon the public duty doctrine. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Draper City was granted summary judgment in this case on the 
basis that it had no legal duty to erect a speed limit sign. The 
undisputed facts set forth by Draper City in its Motion for 
Summary Judgment were not disputed by appellants in the trial 
court below and it properly adopted them in determining there was 
no legal duty. In their Brief, appellants correctly set forth 
six of the seven undisputed facts, but omit one aspect of finding 
of fact number 7. This finding is set forth here, with the 
omitted portion highlighted: 
7. Prior to the accident, Draper had posted a 40 
mph speed limit sign on the west side of the frontage 
road which was visible to southbound traffic. Draper 
City had not placed on the east side of the frontage 
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road any speed limit signs, or other signs warning of 
the intersection, along the one mile stretch from its 
southern-most border to the gravel facility road. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
On October 13, 1993 Kenneth Snell was returning from a Lehi 
animal shelter, where he had picked up a load of animals to take 
to the University of Utah. While traveling northbound on the 
frontage road to Interstate 15, he collided with a truck owned by 
Cazier Excavation, as it was turning eastbound from its southern 
route onto the dirt road accessing Geneva Rock's sand and gravel 
yard. Appellants' sole argument on appeal is that Draper City 
had a duty to place a 40 mph speed limit sign somewhere on the 
one mile stretch of road from its southern-most boundary to the 
intersection with the private road. 
Summary judgment was properly granted by the trial court on 
the grounds that Draper City owed no legal duty to Kenneth Snell 
to erect such a speed limit sign. While a governmental entity 
has a non-delegable duty to maintain streets within its 
boundaries, it has no duty to erect speed limit signs in the 
first instance. Additionally, any duty Draper City owed to erect 
speed limit signs is a duty that runs only to the public at 
large. Because there exists no special relationship between 
Draper City and Kenneth Snell, there is no individual, legal duty 
upon which appellants could base a negligence claim. Finally, 
even if appellants could establish a legal duty, Draper City 
would be immune from suit because it did not have control over 
both the roads upon which the allegedly dangerous condition existed. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
DRAPER CITY HAD NO DUTY TO ERECT A TRAFFIC SIGN CONTROLLING 
SPEED OR WARNING OF AN INTERSECTION WITH A PRIVATE ROAD 
Appellants agree that under Utah law a municipality has "no 
common law duty to place a sign . . . warning motorists of [an] 
approaching intersection." De Villiers v. Utah County, 882 P.2d 
1161, 1167 (Utah App. 1994) / see also, Jones v. Bountiful City 
Corp., 834 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah App. 1992).x In De Villiers, 
plaintiff alleged that a subdivision road had been built by a 
private developer and placed at a location that made it difficult 
for motorists traveling the county road to see. No signs had 
been posted on the county road advising drivers of the allegedly 
dangerous intersection. The Court in De Villiers held that, even 
assuming the intersection posed an unreasonable risk of danger, 
Utah County had no duty to erect warning signs: 
Even if the placement of Oakview Drive created a 
dangerous condition on 6000 West, Utah County still has 
no duty to erect warning signs, even though it has a 
duty to maintain that road in a condition reasonably 
safe for travel. See Jones, 834 P.2d at 560. Thus, 
Utah County had no common law duty to place a sign at 
6000 West warning motorists of the approaching 
intersection. 
De Villiers, 882 P.2d at 1167. The parallel between the 
allegations in De Villiers and this case is obvious. 
Also analogous are the facts in Jones v. Bountiful City 
Corp., supra, in which the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that he 
was injured in an intersection collision because Bountiful City 
xSee page 9 of Appellants' Brief. 
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failed to place signs at the intersection despite its knowledge 
of prior accidents. In discussing the duty issue, the Utah Court 
of Appeals recognized that the duty of a municipality to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its corporate boundaries 
Mis limited in that 'a city is not generally liable for failure 
to install signs or signals.'" Jones, 834 P.2d at 560, citing 19 
Eugene McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 54.02, at 
12 (3d ed. 1985) . The Jones court went on to state "rather than 
placing a duty on a municipality to erect traffic control 
devices, the common law requires only that once the municipality 
takes action to install such devices, it must do so in a non-
negligent manner." Thus, the Court held that Bountiful City had 
"no common law duty to control the intersection with traffic 
signs, even if Bountiful was on notice that . . . foliage 
obstructed a clear view of the intersection." Jones, 834 P.2d at 
560. 
While acknowledging this rule, appellants argue for an 
exception that would swallow it. They argue that because Draper 
City placed a speed limit sign at one spot on the roadway, it 
must answer to Mr. Snell for not placing a similar sign elsewhere 
on the roadway. The duty to erect a speed limit sign, appellants 
argue, is part of its general duty to "regulate the flow of 
traffic" undertaken by having placed a speed limit sign 
elsewhere. Semantics cannot cloak the true nature of appellants' 
argument -- that Draper City should have placed a speed limit 
sign on the east side of the frontage road and south of the 
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intersection with the private dirt road in question in order to 
warn Mr. Snell of the impending intersection. Indeed, this is 
the duty the Court would have to legally impose on Draper City in 
order for appellants to be able to proceed with their negligence 
claim. 
There is simply no Utah precedent to support appellants' 
tortured argument. The only supporting cases cited by appellants 
are Bowan v. River ton City, 656 P. 2d 4 34 (Utah 1982) and Richards 
v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985), both of which involved 
previously erected stop signs that had been knocked down and 
claims that the governmental entities were negligent in failing 
to replace them in a timely manner. Obviously, these cases are 
distinguishable from this case, in which appellants argue that 
Draper City should have erected a speed limit sign in the first 
instance. 
II. 
EVEN IF DRAPER CITY HAD A DUTY TO INSTALL A SPEED 
LIMIT SIGN IN THE FIRST INSTANCE, IT IS A DUTY TO THE GENERAL 
PUBLIC, NOT A DUTY OWED INDIVIDUALLY TO KENNETH SNELL 
Recent cases from Utah appellate courts reiterate the rule 
that a governmental entity has no duty to a member of the general 
public who suffers injury as a result of the entity's alleged 
failure to control the conduct of others, unless the injured 
person can show a relationship special enough to establish an 
individual duty. Ledfors v. Emery County School District, 84 9 
P.2d 1162 (Utah 1993); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231 
(Utah 1993) ; Lamarr v. Utah State Department of Transportation, 
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828 P.2d 535 (Utah App. 1992); Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 
P.2d 586 (Utah App. 1993). The essence of the public duty 
doctrine is that "a duty to all is a duty to none". Rollins v. 
Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156, 1165 (Utah 1991). Unless a plaintiff is 
owed an individual duty by a governmental entity apart from its 
duty to the general public, there is no legal duty upon which the 
plaintiff may base a negligence claim. Madsen v. Borthick, 850 
P.2d 442, 445 (Utah 1993); Lamarr, 828 P.2d at 539. 
The cases of Lamarr and Cannon demonstrate the applicability 
of the "public duty doctrine" to the activity of traffic control. 
In Lamarr, a pedestrian who was struck while walking across an 
overpass brought action against Salt Lake City and the Utah 
Department of Transportation alleging that Salt Lake City owed 
him a duty to maintain a sidewalk on the overpass or to place 
signs that would have prevented him from walking on the roadway 
and/or that the City had a duty to control the transient 
population beneath the overpass so that he was not forced to use 
the allegedly dangerous overpass. The Utah Court of Appeals held 
that these allegations failed to allege a duty upon which a 
negligence claim could be based. This Court found that Lamarr 
had failed to establish that the City had any reason to 
distinguish him from the general public. There was no allegation 
nor evidence that the City had any knowledge whatsoever of 
Lamarr's trip across the overpass. Similarly, in this case, 
there is no allegation that Draper City had some special 
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relationship with Mr. Snell or knowledge of Mr. Snell's 
activities which would give rise to an individual duty. 
In Cannon, plaintiffs had parked at a University of Utah 
parking lot and were proceeding to the Huntsman Center to a 
University of Utah basketball game. While walking north across 
South Campus Drive (a State-owned road, maintained by the Utah 
State Department of Transportation), plaintiffs were struck in a 
crosswalk. Two University police officers had been assigned to 
the crosswalk. Summary judgment was granted to the University of 
Utah under the public duty doctrine and the Utah Court of Appeals 
affirmed, rejecting plaintiffs' argument that they were a 
distinguishable sub-group of "pedestrians" narrower than the 
"general public". This Court reasoned that the duty of the 
police officers was to ensure the safety of pedestrian travel to 
the entire public, not just those pedestrians on their way to the 
basketball game. 
In their Brief, Snells argue that it does not apply to this 
case because "the public duty doctrine governs situations where 
the question is whether or not to impose an affirmative duty to 
act (or protect) for the benefit of a particular plaintiff. It 
does not govern situations where the governmental entity has 
affirmatively undertaken the duty." Appellants' Brief, p. 12. 
This interpretation is not justified by current case law and it 
is not surprising that appellants cite no legal authority for 
their proposition. By contrast, De Villiers speaks to the 
identical issue presented in this case and holds that there is no 
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duty by a governmental entity to erect a sign warning of an 
intersection.2 
Although Snells decline to discuss De Villiers anywhere in 
their Brief on appeal, they apparently would argue that their 
case is different, because their case involves a "speed limit" 
sign as distinguished from a sign warning of an impending 
intersection. Any such distinction, however, is one without a 
difference in the context of this case. Logically, the only 
reason for appellants to argue that a speed limit sign should 
have been placed on the east side of the frontage road and south 
of the intersection in question would be to reduce the speed of 
travelers in light of the impending intersection. Thus, in order 
for it to mean anything, Snells are forced to argue that the 
speed limit sign was necessary because of the intersection. 
Placement of a speed limit sign on the east side of the frontage 
road but north of the intersection would have been irrelevant to 
Mr. Snell on the day of the accident. Obviously, Snells' 
argument in this case is no different than the arguments 
presented and rejected in De Villiers and Jones. 
Finally, appellants argue that this Court should now 
abrogate the public duty doctrine and hold that it does not apply 
to duties related to traffic regulation. This Court has recently 
and frequently had opportunity to examine the public duty 
doctrine in the context of traffic regulation. See, e.g. Cannon 
v. University of Utah, supra; Lamarr v. Utah State Department of 
2See discussion of De Villiers herein, at page 3. 
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Transportation, supra. The policy behind the public duty 
doctrine is sound. To abandon it would subject every 
governmental entity to potential liability and require it to 
defend every case where a plaintiff or co-defendant argued that 
placement of a sign would have prevented third parties from 
driving negligently. 
III. 
DRAPER CITY IS IMMUNE FROM SUIT ALLEGING 
NEGLIGENT SIGNAGE AT THE INTERSECTION OF A 
PUBLIC ROAD WITH A PRIVATE ROAD 
The trial court appropriately considered the legal duty 
issue prior to reaching the issue of governmental immunity 
proposed by Draper City as an additional grounds for summary 
judgment. As this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have 
repeatedly pointed out, the appropriate analysis is to first look 
at the question of duty. If no common law duty exists, there is 
no need to reach a governmental immunity issue. Even so, Utah 
law is clear that immunity would exist in this case, even if 
legal duty could be established. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-8 waives governmental immunity for 
any injury caused by "defective, unsafe or dangerous condition of 
any highway. . . . " In De Villiers, the Utah Court of Appeals 
specifically held that the waiver of governmental immunity for 
unsafe conditions of a highway does not apply unless the 
governmental entity has control over the roads or highways upon 
which the dangerous condition exists. De Villiers, 882 P.2d at 
1165. In De Villiers, as in this case, one of the streets in 
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question was privately owned. Thus, the waiver of immunity 
provision does not apply to the circumstances of this case. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law, appellants cannot establish a legal duty 
owed to Kenneth Snell by Draper City. Draper City had no duty to 
erect speed limit or warning signs in the one-mile stretch 
between its southern border and the intersection with the private 
dirt road in question. Additionally, any duty which it might 
have owed to erect a speed limit sign was a duty owed to the 
general public and not to Kenneth Snell, who has neither alleged 
nor proven a special relationship with Draper City. Beyond the 
duty issue, De Villiers v. Utah County clearly establishes that 
Draper City would be protected by governmental immunity. The 
trial court's summary judgment in favor of Draper City should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this I Mr day of July, 1997. 
WILLIAMS Sc HUNT 
DENNIS C. FERGUSON 
Attorneys for Drapet City 
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